Abstract. We look for a parallel to the notion of "proper forcing" among λ-complete forcing notions not collapsing λ + . We suggest such a definition and prove that it is preserved by suitable iterations. It seems too much to hope for a notion fully parallel to "proper" among λ-complete forcing notions as even for "λ + -c.c. λ-complete" there are problems. We should also remember about ZFC limitations for possible iteration theorems. For example, if in the definition of the forcing notion Q * in Section 3 we demand h p e δ ⊆ h δ , then the proof fails. This may seem a drawback, but one should look at [Sh:f, AP, p.985, 3.6(2) and p.990, 3.9]. By it, if S * = S λ + λ , and (A δ , h δ are as in 3.4 and) we ask a success on a club, then for some h δ : δ ∈ S λ + λ we fail. Now, if we allow only h δ : A δ −→ 2 and we ask for "success of the uniformization" on an end segment of A δ (for all such A δ : δ ∈ S λ + λ ), then we also fail as we may code colourings with values in λ.
Introduction
This work follows [Sh 587] and [Sh 667] (and see history there), but we do not rely on those papers. Our goal in this and the previous papers is to develop a theory parallel to "properness in CS iterations" for iterations with larger supports. In It seems too much to hope for a notion fully parallel to "proper" among λ-complete forcing notions as even for "λ + -c.c. λ-complete" there are problems. We should also remember about ZFC limitations for possible iteration theorems. For example, if in the definition of the forcing notion Q * in Section 3 we demand h p e δ ⊆ h δ , then the proof fails. This may seem a drawback, but one should look at [Sh:f, AP, p.985, 3.6(2) and p.990, 3.9]. By it, if S * = S λ + λ , and (A δ , h δ are as in 3.4 and) we ask a success on a club, then for some h δ : δ ∈ S λ + λ we fail. Now, if we allow only h δ : A δ −→ 2 and we ask for "success of the uniformization" on an end segment of A δ (for all such A δ : δ ∈ S λ + λ ), then we also fail as we may code colourings with values in λ.
In the first section we formulate our definitions (including properness over λ, see 1.3). We believe that our main Definition 1.3 is quite reasonable and applicable. One may also define a version of it where the diamond is "spread out". The second section is devoted to the proof of the preservation theorem, and the next one gives three (relatively easy) examples of forcing notions fitting our scheme. We conclude the paper with the discussion of applications and variants.
Notation 0.1. Our notation is rather standard and compatible with that of classical textbooks (like Jech [J] ). In forcing we keep the older (Cohen's) convention that a stronger condition is the larger one.
(1) For a filter D on λ, the family of all D-positive subsets of λ is called D + . (So A ∈ D + if and only if A ⊆ λ and A ∩ B = ∅ for all B ∈ D.) (2) Every forcing notion P under considerations is assumed to have the weakest condition ∅ P , i.e., (∀p ∈ P)(∅ P ≤ P p). Also we assume * / ∈ P is a fixed object belonging to all the N 's we consider. (3) A tilde indicates that we are dealing with a name for an object in a forcing extension (like x ). The canonical P-name for the P-generic filter over V is denoted by G P . In iterations, ifQ = P ζ , Q ζ : ζ < ζ * and p ∈ lim(Q), then we keep convention that p(α) = ∅ Q α for α ∈ ζ * \ Dom(p). (4) Ordinal numbers will be denoted be the lower case initial letters of the Greek alphabet (α, β, γ . . .) and also by i, j (with possible suband superscripts). (5) A bar above a letter denotes that the object considered is a sequence; usuallyX will be X i : i < ζ) , where ζ denotes the length ofX.
Often our sequences will be indexed by a set of ordinals, say S ⊆ λ, and thenX will typically be X δ : δ ∈ S . Semi-diamond sequences will be calledF (with possible superscripts).
In our definitions (and proofs) we will use somewhat special diamond-like sequences (see 1.1(2)). The difference between them and classical diamonds is quite minor, so let us remind the following.
Definition 0.2.
(1) Let D be a filter on λ. We say thatF = F δ : δ ∈ S is a D-diamond sequence if S ∈ D + , F δ ∈ δ δ for δ ∈ S, and (∀f ∈ λ λ)({δ ∈ S : F δ ⊆ f } ∈ D + ).
We may also call suchF a (D, S)-diamond sequence. (2) We say that (D, S) has diamonds if there is a (D, S)-diamond. We say that D has diamonds if D is a normal filter on λ and for every S ∈ D + there is a (D, S)-diamond.
Definition 0.3. A forcing notion P is λ-complete if every ≤ P -increasing chain of length less than λ has an upper bound in P. It is λ-lub-complete if every ≤ P -increasing chain of length less than λ has a least upper bound in P.
Proposition 0.4.
(1) If D is a filter on λ, then the family of all diagonal intersections of members of D constitutes a normal filter (but in general not necessarily proper). We call this family the normal filter generated by D.
(2) If P is a λ-complete forcing notion and D is a normal filter on λ, then in V P the filter D generates a proper normal filter on λ.
[Abusing notation, we will denote this filter also by D or, if we want to stress that we work in the forcing extension, by
Definition 0.5 and Proposition 0.6 below are not central for us, but they may be used to get somewhat stronger results, see [Sh:F509].
Definition 0.5. Let pr be a definable pairing function on λ, for example pr(α, β) = ω α+β + β, and letF = F δ : δ ∈ S be a D-diamond sequence.
For an ordinal α < λ we letF
is a function with domain δ and such that
otherwise.
Proposition 0.6. IfF is a D-diamond sequence, then for every α < λ,
Throughout the paper we will assume the following:
Context 0.7. (a) λ is an uncountable cardinal, λ = λ <λ , and (b) D is a normal filter on λ (usually D is the club filter D λ on λ), (c) S ∈ D + contains all successor ordinals below λ, 0 / ∈ S, and S = λ\S is unbounded in λ, (d) there is a (D, S)-diamond sequence.
The definitions
In this section we define a special genericity game, properness over (D, S)-semi diamonds and the class of forcing notions we are interested in. Definition 1.1. Let P be a forcing notion and let N ≺ (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ) be such that N = λ, N <λ ⊆ N and {λ, P, D, S} ∈ N . Let h : λ −→ N be such that the range Rang(h) of the function h includes P ∩ N .
(1) We say thatF = F δ : δ ∈ S is a (D, S)-semi diamond sequence if F δ ∈ δ δ for δ ∈ S and ( * ) for every ≤ P -increasing sequencep = p α : α < λ ⊆ P ∩ N we have
(2) LetF be a (D, S)-semi diamond. A sequenceq = q δ : δ ∈ S ⊆ N ∩ P is called an (N, h, P)-candidate overF (or: (N, h, P,F )-candidate) whenever (α) for every open dense subset I ∈ N of P {δ ∈ S : q δ ∈ I} = S mod D, and (β) if δ ∈ S is a limit ordinal and h • F δ (α) : α < δ is a ≤ Pincreasing sequence of members of P ∩ N , then q δ is its upper bound in P. (3) Letq be an (N, h, P,F )-candidate and r ∈ P. We define a game (r, N, h, P,F ,q) of two players, the generic player and the antigeneric player, as follows. A play lasts λ moves, in the i th move conditions r − i , r i ∈ P and a set C i ∈ D are chosen such that
• the generic player chooses r − i , r i , C i if i ∈ S, and the anti-generic player chooses r
If at some moment during the play there is no legal move for one of the players, then the anti-generic player wins. If the play lasted λ moves, then the generic player wins the play whenever ( ) if δ ∈ S ∩ i<δ C i is a limit ordinal, and h • F δ (α) :
condition r ∈ P is (N, h, P)-generic forq overF if the generic player has a winning strategy in the game (r, N, h, P,F ,q).
Observation 1.2.
(1) In the game (r, N, h, P,F ,q), for each of the players, if it increases conditions r − i , r i , its choice can only improve its situation. Making sets C i (for i ∈ S) smaller can only help the generic player.
(2) If forcing with P does not add new subsets to λ, then the game in Definition 1.1(5) degenerates as without loss of generality r forces a value to G P ∩ N ; the condition does not degenerate, in fact this condition (which implies adding no new λ-sequences) is preserved by (< λ + )-support iterations (see [Sh 587]). (3) Also if S 1 ⊆ S mod D, S 1 ∈ D + , then in Definition 1.1 we can replace S by S 1 . (Again, the generic player can guarantee C i ∩ S 1 ⊆ S.) (4) If P is λ-complete and r is (N, P)-generic (in the usual sense, i.e., r P " N [G P ] ∩ V = N "), then both players have always legal moves in the game (r, N, h, P,F ,q). Also if the forcing notion P is λ-lub-complete, then both players have always legal moves in the game (r, N, h, P,F ,q) (for any r).
Definition 1.3.
(1) Let S ∈ D + . We say that a forcing notion P is proper over (D, S)-semi diamonds whenever (there is a (D, S)-diamond and):
(a) P is λ-complete, and (b) if χ is large enough, p ∈ P and N ≺ (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ), N = λ, N <λ ⊆ N and {λ, p, P, D, S, . . .} ∈ N , and h : λ −→ N satisfies P∩N ⊆ Rang(h), andF is a (D, S)-semi diamond for (N, h, P), andq = q δ : δ ∈ S is an (N, h, P,F )-candidate, then there is r ∈ P stronger than p and such that r is (N, h, P)-generic forq overF .
(2) P is said to be proper over D-semi diamonds if it is proper over (D, S)-semi diamonds for every S ∈ D + (so D has diamonds). The family of forcing notions proper over D-semi diamonds is denoted K 1 D . (3) A forcing notion P is proper over λ if it is proper over D-semi diamonds for every normal filter D on λ which has diamonds.
Remark 1.4. Does D matter? Yes, as we may use some "large D" and be interested in preserving its largeness properties.
Proposition 1.5. If P is a λ + -complete forcing notion, then P is proper over λ.
Proof. Straightforward.
In fact we can even demand: (+) if I ∈ N is an open dense subset of P, then q δ ∈ I for every large enough δ. (2) Let r be (N, h, P)-generic overF for some (N, h, P,F )-candidateq.
Then (a) if r − i , r i , C i : i < λ is a result of a play of (r, N, h, P,F ,q) in which the generic player uses its winning strategy, then
is a subset of P ∩ N generic over N , and (b) r is (N, P)-generic (in the usual sense).
(a) forcing with P does not collapse λ + , (b) forcing with P preserves the following two properties:
, the stationarity of Y under the relevant filter).
Proof. 1) Immediate (by the λ-completeness of P).
2) Clause (a) should be clear (remember 1.1(2)(α)). For clause (b) note that 0 ∈ S , so in the game (r, N, h, P,F ,q) the condition r 0 is chosen by the anti-generic player. So if the conclusion fails, then for some P-name α ∈ N for an ordinal we have r " α ∈ N ". Thus the anti-generic player can choose r 0 so that r 0 " α = α 0 " for some ordinal α 0 / ∈ N , what guarantees it to win the play.
3) Straightforward from 2).
Very often checking properness over D-semi diamonds (for particular examples of forcing notions) we get somewhat stronger properties, which motivate the following definition. Definition 1.7. We say that a condition r ∈ P is N -generic for D-semi diamonds if it is (N, h, P)-generic forq overF whenever h,q,F are as in 1.1. Omitting D we mean "for every normal filter D with diamonds".
The following notion is not of main interest in this paper, but surely it is interesting from the point of view of general theory. Definition 1.8. Let 0 < α < λ + .
(1) Let S ∈ D + . We say that a forcing notion P is α-proper over (D, S)-semi diamonds whenever (a) P is λ-complete, and (b) if χ is large enough, p ∈ P and •N = N β : β < α is an increasing sequence of elementary submodels of (H(χ), ∈) such that N β = λ, N <λ β ⊆ N β , {λ, p, P,N β} ∈ N β , and
N β , and •F β is a (D, S)-semi diamond sequence for (N β , h β , P), and •q β = q β δ : δ ∈ S is an (N β , h β , P)-candidate overF β , and q γ : γ < β ∈ N β , then there is r ∈ P above p which is (N β , h β , P)-generic forq β overF β for each β < α.
(2) We define "P is α-proper over D-semi diamonds" (and K α D ) and "P is α-proper over λ" in a way parallel to 1.3(2,3).
Remark 1.9. Note that for α = 1 (in Definition 1.8) we get the same notions as in Definition 1.3.
The preservation theorem
In 2.7 below we prove a preservation theorem for our forcing notions. It immediately gives the consistency of the suitable Forcing Axiom, see 4.1. Also the proof actually specifies which semi-diamond sequencesF are used.
First, recall that Proposition 2.1. Suppose that P α , Q α : α < ζ * is a (< λ + )-support iteration such that for each α < ζ * Pα " Q α is λ-complete. " Then the forcing P ζ * is λ-complete.
Before we engage in the proof of the preservation theorem, let us prove some facts of more general nature than the one of our main context. If, e.g., all iterands are λ-lub-complete, then Proposition 2.3 below is obvious.
Temporary Context 2.2. LetQ = P α , Q α : α < ζ * be a (< λ + )-support iteration of λ-complete forcing notions. We also suppose that N is a model as in 1.1,Q, . . . ∈ N .
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that ζ ∈ (ζ * +1)∩N is a limit ordinal of cofinality cf(ζ) < λ and r ∈ P ζ is such that
Assume that conditions s β ∈ N ∩ P ζ (for β < δ, δ < λ) are such that
Then there are conditions s ∈ N ∩ P ζ and r + ∈ P ζ such that s ≤ r + , r ≤ r + and (∀β < δ)(s β ≤ s).
The choice is clearly possible as r i γ is (N, P iγ )-generic.)
Let r + ∈ P ζ be an upper bound of r γ : γ < cf(ζ) (remember clause (γ) above); then also r ≤ r + . Now we are going to define a condition s ∈ P ζ ∩N . We let Dom(s) = {Dom(r − γ+1 )∩[i γ , i γ+1 ) : γ < cf(ζ)}, and for ξ ∈ Dom(s), i γ ≤ ξ < i γ+1 , we let s(ξ) be a P ξ -name for the following object in V[G P ξ ] (for a generic filter G P ξ ⊆ P ξ over V):
It should be clear that s ∈ P ζ ∩ N . Now,
• s ≤ r + . Why? By induction on ξ ∈ ζ ∩N we show that s ξ ≤ r + ξ. Steps "ξ = 0" and "ξ limit" are clear, so suppose that we have proved s ξ ≤ r + ξ, i γ ≤ ξ < i γ+1 (and we are interested in the restrictions to ξ + 1). Assume that G P ξ ⊆ P ξ is a generic filter over V such that r + ξ ∈ G P ξ . Since
and we are done.
The proof of the proposition will be finished once we show • (∀β < δ)(s β ≤ s). Why does this hold? By induction on ξ ∈ ζ ∩ N we show that s β ξ ≤ s ξ for all β < δ. Steps "ξ = 0" and "ξ limit" are as usual clear, so suppose that we have proved s β ξ ≤ s ξ (for β < δ), i γ ≤ ξ < i γ+1 (and we are interested in the restrictions to ξ + 1). Assume that G P ξ ⊆ P ξ is a generic filter over V such that s ξ ∈ G P ξ . Then also (by the inductive hypothesis) {s β ξ : β < δ} ⊆ G P ξ and therefore s β (ξ)[G P ξ ] : β < δ is an increasing sequence of conditions from the (λ-complete) forcing Q ξ [G P ξ ]. Thus this sequence has an upper bound, and s(ξ)[G P ξ ] is such an upper bound (see (i) and (ii) above), as required.
In the proof of the preservation theorem we will (like in the proof of the preservation of properness [Sh:f, Ch.III, §3.3]) have to deal with names for conditions in the iteration. This motivates the following definition (which is in the spirit of [Sh:f, Ch.X], so this is why "RS").
Definition 2.4.
(1) An RS-condition in P ζ * is a pair (p, w) such that w ∈ [(ζ * +1)] <λ is a closed set, 0, ζ * ∈ w, p is a function with domain Dom(p) ⊆ ζ * , and (⊗) 1 for every two successive members ε < ε of the set w, p [ε , ε ) is a P ε -name of an element of P ε whose domain is included in the interval [ε , ε ). The family of all RS-conditions in P ζ * is denoted by P RS ζ * . (2) If (p, w) ∈ P RS ζ * and G P ζ * ⊆ P ζ * is a generic filter over V, then we write (p, w) ∈ G P ζ * whenever (⊗) 2 for every two successive members ε < ε of the set w,
(p 1 , w 1 ) ∈ G P ζ * and for each two successive members ε < ε of the set w 1 ∪ w 2 we have
Remark 2.5. If (p, w) ∈ P RS ζ * , ε ≤ ξ < ε , ε , ε are successive members of w, then p(ξ) is a P ε -name for a P ξ -name of a member of Q ξ . One may look at this name as a P ξ -name. However note that if we apply this approach to each ξ, we may not end up with a condition in P ζ * because of the support! Proposition 2.6.
(
(2) If (p, w) ∈ P ζ * and q ∈ P ζ * , then there is q * ∈ P ζ * stronger than q and such that for each successive members ε < ε of w the condition
, and s ∈ P ζ * ∩ N , r ∈ P ζ * be such that
Assume that either r is (N, P ζ * )-generic, or ζ * is a limit ordinal of cofinality cf(ζ * ) < λ and for every ζ < ζ * the condition r ζ is (N, P ζ )-generic.
Then there are conditions s ∈ N ∩ P ζ * and r ∈ P ζ * such that
Proof.
(1), (2) Straightforward (use the λ-completeness of P ζ * ).
(3) If r is (N, P ζ * )-generic, then our assertion is clear (remember clause (2)). So suppose that we are in the second case (so
Let r * ∈ P ζ * be stronger than all r γ 's. Now apply 2.3. Now we may state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2.7. Let D, S, S be as in 0.7. Assume thatQ = P α , Q α : α < ζ * is a (< λ + )-support iteration such that for each α < ζ * Pα " Q α is proper for D-semi diamonds ".
Proof. By 2.1, the forcing notion P ζ * is λ-complete, so we have to concentrate on showing clause 1.3(1)(b) for it.
So suppose that χ is large enough, p ∈ P ζ * and
We may assume that for each δ ∈ S ( ) if h • F δ (α) : α < δ is not a ≤ P ζ * -increasing sequence of members of P ζ * ∩ N , then h • F δ (α) = * for all α < δ.
[Just suitably modify F δ whenever the assumption of ( ) holds -note that the modification does not change the notion of a candidate, the game from 1.1(3), etc.]
Before we define a generic condition r ∈ P ζ * forq overF , let us introduce notation used later and give two important facts.
Let i ∈ N ∩ (ζ * + 1) and let G P i ⊆ P i be generic over V. We define:
is a function, and * otherwise;
Plainly, by ( ),
Claim 2.7.2. Assume that i ∈ N ∩(ζ * +1) and r ∈ P i is (N,
(1)
Proof of the Claim. (1) Will follow from (2).
(2) Assume that this fails. Then we can find a condition r * ∈ P i , a P inameq = q α : α < λ ⊆ N for an increasing sequence of conditions from Q i , and P i -names Ã ξ for members of D ∩ V such that r ≤ P i r * ∈ G P i and
Consider a play r
) in which the generic player uses its winning strategy and the anti-generic player plays as follows. In addition to keeping the rules of the game, it makes sure that at stage j ∈ S :
• r j ≥ r * (so r 0 ≥ r * ; remember the anti-generic player plays at 0), • r j decides the values of all Ã ξ for ξ < j.
Let A ξ ∈ D ∩ V be such that r j " Ã ξ = A ξ " for sufficiently large j ∈ S . Note that the sequence r
(3) Should be clear.
Fix a bijection Υ :
Next, by induction, we choose a sequence (p i , w i ) :
if i < λ is a limit ordinal, then w i is the closure of j<i w j , and if, additionally, ε ∈ Dom(q i ) is such that Υ(ε) ≥ i (and i ∈ S, of course), then ε ∈ Dom(p i ) and p i (ε) is such that (⊗) for every generic G P ζ * ⊆ P ζ * over V such that (p i , w i ) ∈ G P ζ * , and two successive members ε , ε of the set w i such that ε ≤ ε < ε we have:
is such an upper bound, (iv) for each i < λ, for some ξ ∈ N ∩ ζ i and a P ξ -name τ ∈ N we have:
(It should be clear that there are no problems in the induction and it is possible to pick (p i , w i ) as above.) From now on we will treat each p i (ξ) as a P ξ -name for a member of Q ξ . Now we are going to define an (N, h, P ζ * )-generic condition r ∈ P forq overF in the most natural way. Its domain is Dom(r) = ζ * ∩ N and for
Main Claim 2.7.3. For every ζ ∈ (ζ * + 1) ∩ N , the generic player has a winning strategy in the game (r ζ, N, h [ζ] , P ζ ,F ,q [ζ] ).
Proof of the Claim. We will prove the claim by induction on ζ ∈ (ζ * +1)∩N . For ζ ∈ ζ * ∩ N this implies that r(ζ) is well-defined (remember 2.7.2). Of course for ζ = ζ * we finish the proof of the theorem.
Suppose that ζ ∈ (ζ * + 1) ∩ N and we know that r ζ is (N, h [ζ ] , P ζ )-generic forq [ζ ] overF for all ζ ∈ N ∩ ζ. We are going to describe a winning strategy for the generic player in the game (r ζ, N, h [ζ] , P ζ ,F ,q [ζ] ). The inductive hypothesis is not used in the full strength in the definition of the strategy, but we need it in several places, e.g., to know that r is well defined as well as that we have the st i 's below. Also note that it implies that (p Moreover, during the play, both players will always have legal moves. Why? By the inductive hypothesis we know that r ζ is (N, P ζ )-generic for all ζ ∈ ζ ∩ N . Therefore, if ζ is a successor or a limit ordinal of cofinality ≥ λ, then we immediately get that r ζ is (N, P ζ )-generic (remember clause (iv) of the choice of the p i 's!), and thus 1.2(4) applies. If ζ is a limit ordinal of cofinality cf(ζ) < λ, then we may use 2.3.
Let st i be a P i -name for the winning strategy of the generic player in (r(i), N [G P i ], h i , Q i ,F i ,q i ), and let E 0 def = {δ < λ : δ is a limit of points from S }.
Plainly, E 0 is a club of λ.
Let the generic player play as follows. Aside it will construct sequences r j (ε), r ⊕ j (ε) : j < λ, ε ∈ ζ ∩ N and C ξ j (ε) : j , ξ < λ, ε ∈ ζ ∩ N so that • r j (ε) is a P ε -name for a member of Q ε ∩ N [G Pε ], r ⊕ j (ε) is a P ε -name for a member of Q ε , C ξ j (ε) is a P ε -name for a member of D ∩ V, and • if j ∈ S, j ≤ j, and Υ(ε) ≤ j, then after the j th move (which is a move of the generic player) the terms C ξ j (ε) : ξ < λ , r j (ε), and r ⊕ j (ε) are defined. So suppose that j * ∈ S and r − j , r j , C j : j < j * is the result of the play so far. To clearly describe the answer of the generic player we will consider two (only slightly different) cases in the order in which they appear in the game. (Remember (r 0 , C 0 ) is chosen by the anti-generic player and that all successor moves are done by the generic player.)
Case 1: j 0 < j < min(S \ (j 0 + 1)) = j 1 , j 0 ∈ S . First the generic player picks conditions s − , s ∈ P ζ , s − ∈ N such that r − j 0 ≤ s − ≤ s, r j 0 ≤ s and for each ξ ∈ ζ ∩ N we have
[Why possible? By 2.6(3).] Now the generic player looks at ε γ < ζ such that Υ(ε γ ) = γ < j 1 . It picks
is a play according to st εγ in which the moves of the anti-generic player are determined as follows. First, it keeps the convention that if j ∈ S \ S εγ , then (r j (ε γ ), r
is (a name for) the < * χ -first legal answer to the play so far. Now, if γ < j 0 , then we have already the play up to j 0 (it easily follows from the inductive construction that s ε γ indeed forces that it is a "legal" play). The j th 0 move of the anti-generic player is stipulated as
C j , and next we continue up to j 1 keeping our convention. If j 0 ≤ γ < j 1 , then the generic player lets
C j and then it "plays" the game according to st εγ up to j 1 keeping our convention for all j / ∈ S εγ . Next, the generic player picks a condition r * ∈ P ζ and P εγ -names τ j (ε γ ) ∈ N (for γ < j 1 , ε γ < ζ, j 0 < j < j 1 ) such that
• r * ≥ s, and for every γ, j < j 1 , and
• for every j, ξ < j 1 and γ < j 1 with ε γ < ζ, the condition r * ε γ decides the value of C ξ j (ε γ ), and
and for ξ ∈ Dom(r
" if Υ(ξ) < j 1 and τ j (ξ) : j 0 < j < j 1 is an increasing sequence of conditions stronger than s − (ξ), then r
Finally, for j ∈ (j 0 , j 1 ) it plays r − j , r * , {C ξ j (ε γ ) : j , γ, ξ < j 1 , ε γ < ζ}. Case 2: sup{i ∈ S : i < j } = j 0 ≤ j < min(S \ j 0 ) = j 1 , j 0 ∈ S. The generic player proceeds as above, the difference is that now j 0 "belongs to" the generic player, and that it is a limit of moves of the anti-generic player. Again, we look at ε γ < ζ such that Υ(ε γ ) = γ < j 1 .
If γ < j 0 , then every condition in P εγ stronger than all r j ε γ (for j < j 0 ) forces that
is a legal play in which the generic player uses st εγ . The generic player determines r j (ε γ ), r ⊕ j (ε γ ), and C ξ j (ε γ ) for j ∈ [j 0 , j 1 ) "playing the game" as earlier (with the same convention that if j ∈ S \ S εγ , then the j -th move of the anti-generic player is stipulated as the < * χ -first legal move). If j 0 ≤ γ < j 1 , then (any condition stronger than all r j ε γ for j < j 0 forces that) r − j (ε) : j < j 0 , r j (ε) : j < j 0 are increasing, and r − j (ε γ ) ≤ r j (ε γ ) and r(ε γ ) is (N [G Pε γ ], Q εγ )-generic. So, by 1.2(4), the generic player may let (r 0 (ε γ ), r ⊕ 0 (ε γ )) be the < * χ -first such that for all j < j 0 we have r
Then the generic player chooses r j (ε γ ), r ⊕ j (ε γ ), and C ξ j (ε γ ) for 0 < j < j 1 "playing the game" with the strategy st εγ (and keeping the old convention for j / ∈ S εγ ). Next the generic player picks a condition r * ∈ P ζ (stronger than all r j for j < j 0 ), P εγ -names τ j (ε γ ) ∈ N and sets C ξ j (ε γ ) ∈ D ∩ V (for j , γ, ξ < j 1 ) as in the previous case. Then it chooses conditions s − ∈ N ∩ P ζ and r + ∈ P ζ such that r * ≤ r + and (∀j < j 0 )(r 
Why does the strategy described above work? Suppose that r j , C j : j < λ is a play of the game (r ζ, N, h [ζ] , P ζ ,F ,q [ζ] ) in which the generic player used this strategy and let r j (ε) : j < λ, ε ∈ ζ ∩ N and C ξ j (ε) : j , ξ < λ, ε ∈ ζ ∩ N be the sequences it constructed aside. (As we said earlier, the game surely lasted λ steps and thus the sequences described above have length λ.)
Let us argue that condition 1.1(3)( ) holds.
Assume that a limit ordinal δ ∈ S ∩ j<δ C j (so in particular δ ∈ E 0 ) is
We are going to show that q δ ≤ r δ and for this we prove by induction on ε ∈ (ζ + 1) ∩ N that q δ ε ≤ r δ ε. For ε = ζ this is the desired conclusion. For ε = 0 this is trivial, and for a limit ε it follows from the definition of the order (and the inductive hypothesis).
So assume that we have proved q δ ε ≤ r δ ε, ε < ζ, and let us consider the restrictions to ε + 1. If Υ(ε) ≥ δ then by the choice of conditions s, s − in Case 1, we know that
. Now look at the clause (iii) of the choice of the p δ at the beginning: what we have just stated (and ( * ) δ ) implies that r δ ε " p δ (ε) is an upper bound to {q δ (ε)} ∪ {p i (ε) : i < δ} ". thus, r δ ε " q δ (ε) ≤ p δ (ε) ≤ r δ (ε) ", so we are done. Suppose now that Υ(ε) < δ and let j 1 = min(S \ δ). Look at what the generic player has written aside: r δ ε forces that r j (ε), r Remark 2.8. Note that if the iterands Q ξ are (forced to be) λ-lub-closed, then the proof of 2.7 substantially simplifies.
Examples
Our first example of a proper over λ forcing notion is a relative of the forcing introduced by Baumgartner for adding a club to ℵ 1 . Its variants were also studied in Abraham and Shelah [AbSh 146]; see also [Sh:f, Ch.III].
The forcing notion P * is defined as follows: a condition in P * is a function p such that (a) Dom(p) ⊆ λ + , Rang(p) ⊆ λ + , |Dom(p)| < λ, and (b) if α 1 < α 2 are both from Dom(p), then p(α 1 ) < α 2 ; the order ≤ of P * is the inclusion ⊆.
Clearly, Proposition 3.1. P * is λ-lub-complete and |P * | = λ + .
But also, Proposition 3.2. P * is proper over λ.
Proof. Assume N ≺ (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ) is as in 1.1, and p ∈ P * ∩ N . Put j * = N ∩ λ + and r = p ∪ { j * , j * }.
Claim 3.2.1.
(1) If r ∈ P, r ≤ r , then r j * ∈ N ∩P * and r j * ≤ r .
(2) If r ∈ P, r ≤ r , and r j * ≤ r ∈ N ∩ P * , then r ∪ r ∈ P * is stronger than both r and r . (3) Ifp = p ξ : ξ < ζ * ⊆ P * is ≤-increasing and ζ * < λ, thenp has a least upper bound q ∈ P * , and q j * is a least upper bound of p ξ j * : ξ < ζ * .
Proof of the Claim.
(1) By the definition of P * ,
(2), (3) Should be clear.
Claim 3.2.2. r is N -generic for semi-diamonds (see 1.7).
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that D is a normal filter on λ, S ∈ D + . Let h : λ −→ N be such that N ∩ P * ⊆ Rang(h),F = F δ : δ ∈ S be a (D, S)-semi diamond, and letq = q δ : δ ∈ S be an (N, h, P * ,F )-candidate. We have to show that the condition r is (N, h, P * )-generic forq overF , and for this we have to show that the generic player has a winning strategy in the game (r, N, h, P * ,F ,q). Note that the set E 0 def = {δ < λ : δ is a limit of members of S } is a club of λ (so E 0 ∈ D). Now, the strategy that works for the generic player is the following one:
At stage δ ∈ S of the play, when a sequence r − i , r i , C i : i < δ has been already constructed, the generic player lets C δ = E 0 \ (δ + 1) and it asks: ( * ) Is there a common upper bound to {r i : i < δ} ∪ {q δ } ? If the answer to ( * ) is "yes", then the generic player puts Y = {r i : i < δ} ∪ {q δ }; otherwise it lets Y = {r i : i < δ}. Now it chooses r δ to be the < * χ -first element of P * stronger than all members of Y and r − δ = r δ j * ∈ N .
Why the strategy described above is the winning one? Let r − i , r i , C i : i < λ be a play according to this strategy. Suppose that δ ∈ S ∩ i<λ C i is a limit ordinal such that h • F δ (α) : α < δ = r − α : α < δ . So, q δ is stronger than all r − α (for α < δ), and for cofinally many α < δ we have r − α = r α j * . Therefore, q δ ≥ r − α j * and (by 3.2.1) {r α : α < δ} ∪ {q δ } has an upper bound. Now look at the choice of r δ .
The proposition follows immediately from 3.2.2. Proposition 3.3.
(1) P * is α-proper over λ if and only if α < λ. (2) Assume α < λ. LetN = N β : β < α , h β : λ −→ N β andq β be as in 1.8(1b), p ∈ P * ∩N 0 . Let j * β = N β ∩ λ + (for β < α) and put r = p ∪ {(j * β , j * β ) : β < α}. Clearly r ∈ P * and r j * β ∈ N β for each β < α (rememberN β ∈ N β ). By the proof of 3.2, the condition r j * β+1 is (N β , h β , P * )-generic forq β overF To show that P * / ∈ K α,s D [F ] for α ≥ λ, it is enough to do this for α = λ. So, pick anyN = N β : β < λ , h β : λ −→ N β andq β as in 1.8(1b), and let
Let φ be a P * -name for the generic partial function from λ + to λ + , that is, P * φ = G P * . We claim that
Otherwise, we let δ * = N β 0 ∩ λ + and δ * * = N β 0 +1 ∩ λ + , and we put q = p ∪ {(δ * , δ * * )}. Then clearly q ∈ P * is a condition stronger than p and
It should be clear that ( ) implies that there is no condition r ∈ P * which is (N β , h β , P * )-generic forq β for all β < α (remember 1.6(2)).
For the second example we assume the following. The forcing notion Q * is defined as follows: 
the order ≤ of Q * is such that p ≤ q if and only if u p ⊆ u q , h p ⊆ h q , v p ⊆ v q , and for each δ ∈ v p the set e q δ is an end-extension of e p δ . A tuple p = (u p , v p ,ē p , h p ) satisfying clauses (a), (b) and (d) above will be called a pre-condition. Note that every pre-condition can be extended to a condition in Q * .
Plainly:
Proposition 3.5. The forcing notion Q * is λ-lub-complete. Also Q * satisfies the λ + -chain condition.
Proposition 3.6. Q * is proper over λ.
Proof. Assume N ≺ (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ) is as in 1.1, A δ , h δ : δ ∈ S * ∈ N and p ∈ Q * ∩ N . We are going to show that the condition p is N -generic for semi-diamonds.
So suppose that h,q andF are as in 1.1. For r ∈ Q * , let r N be such that u r N = u ∩ N , v r N = v ∩ N ,ē r N =ē r N , h r N = h r N . Note that r N ∈ N . Let us describe the winning strategy of the generic player in the game (p, N, h, P * ,F ,q). For this we first fix a list {j i : i < λ} of N ∩ S * , and we let E 0 = {δ < λ : δ is a limit of members of S }.
Suppose that we arrive to a stage δ ∈ S and r − i , r i , C i : i < δ is the sequence played so far. The generic player first picks a condition r δ stronger than all r i 's played so far and, if possible, stronger than q δ . Then it plays a condition r δ above r δ such that
• if γ ∈ v r δ , then otp(e r δ γ ) > δ, and • {j i : i < δ} ⊆ v r δ , and r − δ = r δ N . The set C δ played a this stage is [α, λ)∩E 0 , where α is the first ordinal such that v r δ ∩N ⊆ {j i : i < α} and otp(A γ ∩(max(e r δ γ )+1)) < α for all γ ∈ v r δ .
Why is this a winning strategy? Let r − i , r i , C i : i < λ be a play according to this strategy, and suppose that δ ∈ S ∩ i<λ C i is a limit ordinal such that
We want to show that there there is a common upper bound to {r i : i < δ} ∪ {q δ } (which, by the definition of our strategy, will finish the proof). First we choose a pre-condition r = (u r , v r ,ē r , h r ) such that:
Why is the choice possible? As δ / ∈ S ! Now we may extend r to a condition in Q * picking for each γ ∈ v r large enough β γ ∈ A γ and adding β γ to e r γ (and extending u r , h r suitably).
Our last example is a natural generalization of the forcing notion D ω from Newelski and Ros lanowski [NeRo93] . Let us work in the context of 0.7.
Definition 3.7.
(1) A set T ⊆ <λ λ is a complete λ-tree if (a) (∀η ∈ T )(∃ν ∈ T )(η ν), and T has the -smallest element called root(T ),
The set of all λ-branches through T is called lim λ (T ). (5) A subset F of the λ-tree T is a front in T if no two distinct members of F are -comparable and
(6) For η ∈ T we let (T ) [η] = {ν ∈ T : η ν}.
Now we define a forcing notion D λ : A condition in D λ is a complete λ-tree T such that (a) root(T ) ∈ split(T ) and (∀η ∈ split(T ))(succ T (η) = λ), (b) (∀η ∈ T )(∃ν ∈ T )(η ν ∈ split(T )), (c) if δ < λ is limit and a sequence η i :
The order of D λ is the reverse inclusion.
Proposition 3.8. D λ is proper over λ.
Proof. First let us argue that
is a condition in D λ . Clearly T is a tree, and root(T ) = α<δ root(T α ). By clause (c) (for T α 's) we see that succ T (root(T )) = λ, and in a similar way we justify that T satisfies other demands as well. Now suppose that D, S, N, h,F andq are as in 1.1, T ∈ D λ ∩ N . Choose inductively complete λ-trees T α ∈ D λ ∩ N and fronts and it takes C i as earlier.
Why is this a winning strategy? First, as D λ is λ-lub-complete, the play really lasts λ moves. Suppose that δ ∈ S ∩ i<δ C i is such that h • F δ (α) : α < δ = r − α : α < δ . Let η = α<δ root(r − α ). Note that (as δ ∈ E 0 and by (B)) we have η ∈ F δ and (by (A)) α<δ r − α is included in T δ . Therefore, by clause (v) of the choice of the T δ , for some ν ∈ T δ we have η ν ∈ F δ+1 and q δ ≤ (T δ+1 ) [ν] . But this immediately implies that it was possible to choose r − i stronger than q δ in (C) (remember r = α<δ T α ).
4. Discussion 4.1. The Axiom. We can derive Forcing Axiom as usual, see [Sh:f, Ch. VII, VIII]. E.g., if κ is a supercompact cardinal larger than λ, then we can find a κ-cc λ-complete, proper over D-semi diamonds forcing notion P of cardinality κ such that
• P 2 λ = κ • P collapses every µ ∈ (λ + , κ), no other cardinal is collapsed,
if Q is a forcing notion proper over D-semi diamonds, I α are open dense subsets of Q for α < λ + , then there is a directed set G ⊆ Q intersecting every I α (for α < λ + ). If we restrict ourselves to |Q| = κ, it is enough that κ is indiscrebable enough.
In ZFC, we have to be more careful concerning Q. 
Why our definitions?
The main reason why our definitions are (perhaps) somewhat complicated is that, in addition to ZFC limitations, we wanted to cover some examples with "large creatures" (to be presented in [RoSh 777]). We also wanted to have a real preservation theorem: the (limit of the) iteration is of the same type as the iterands (though for many applications the existence of (N, P ζ )-generic conditions could be enough). Why do we have the sets C i in the game, and not just say that "the set of good δ's is in D"? It is caused by the fact that already if we want to deal with the composition of two forcing notions (the successor step), the respective set from D would have appeared only after the play, and there would be simply too many possible sets to consider. With the current definition the generic player discovers during the play which δ ∈ S are active.
Why semi-diamonds (and not just diamonds)? As we want thatq i ,F i are as claimed in 2.7.2 (for the respective parameters).
4.4. Strategic completeness. We may replace "λ-complete" by (a variant of) "strategically λ-complete". This requires some changes in our definitions (and proofs) and it will be treated in [Sh:F509].
Relation to [Sh 587
]. There is a drawback in the approach presented in this paper: we do not include the one from [Sh 587], say when S ⊆ S λ + λ is stationary and S λ + λ \ S is also stationary. One of possible modification of the present definitions for the case of inaccessible λ, can be sketched as follows. We have λ δ : δ ∈ S , λ δ = (λ δ ) |δ| ; q = q δ : δ ∈ S is replaced byq = q δ,t : δ ∈ S, t ∈ Par δ * ,δ (where δ * = N ∩ λ + ), andPar = Par δ * ,δ : δ ∈ S ∈ V is constant for the iteration (like D).
In the forcing P: forp = p j : j < δ , δ ∈ S, t ∈ Par δ * ,δ , there is an upper bound q[p, t] ofp (this is a part of P).
